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The following article, reprinted from The New Leader of Jan.
12, 1958, a newspaper in Delhi, India, is a criticism of certain
Far Eastern educational legislation in light of fundamental rights.
THE KERALA
EDUCATION BILL
JOSEPH MINATTUR, M.A., LL.B., J.D.
T HE KERALA EDUCATION BILL, 1957, is avowedly for the better
organisation and development of educational institutions in the State.
The purpose is, therefore, laudable but the means adopted are of a
doubtful character, as some of the sections of the Bill are in clear contra-
vention of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution of India.
Curtailing Rights
It is quite praiseworthy to improve the service conditions of the
teachers in aided schools. That the Bill seeks to make them equal to
the teachers of Government schools in all important respects is a fact
that not only elicits gratitude from the teachers concerned, but also
commends itself to every thinking person in the State as well as outside. It
is just and proper that rules be made to prevent abuse of their powers by
managers of educational agencies, but that does not justify the enactment
,qf such laws as would substantially curtail the right of children and their
guardians to the free exercise of their religion.
The saving clause (Section 38) 1 and Section 27 (2) (a) 2 seem to
leave the religious-minded parents of a child with two heartless alterna-
tives: either they should send the child to an educational institution of
the kind contemplated in Section 27 (2) (a), making a substantial
contribution towards the maintenance of the institution, or they should
send the child to a Government school or "private" school where non-
religious teachers may teach him by example, if not by direct precept,
the tenets of a materialistic cult. This is an unjust choice and, when
parents are coerced into it, may prove unconstitutional too.
1 Section 38: "Nothing in this Act shall apply to any school which is not a Gov-
ernment school or a private school."
2 Section 27: "A child may be exempted for a specified period or periods from
compulsory attendance at school under this act . . . (2) by the Local Education
Committee, (a) when it is receiving, otherwise than in a Government or Private
School, instruction in an educational institution approved by the Local Education
Committee."
It is difficult to understand what type of
educational institution is contemplated in
Section 27 (2) (a). If it is run. by a
minority, linguistic or religious, it has to be
granted aid under Article 30 (2) of the
Constitution, and then it becomes an aided
school and the saving clause will not cover
such an institution. If it is run by any person
or group of persons meeting state standards
for public institutions, it has to be recog-
nised, and then it becomes a recognised
school which again is not, exempted by the
saving clause. If the institution does not
meet state standards, it will not be right for
the Local Education Committee to approve
it. If it is approved by the Committee and
recognised by the Government, in all fair-
ness it has to be granted aid, for it is the
duty of the State to help the institution
through financial aid when it makes a contri-
bution to one of the public services under-
taken by the State. All this boils down to
the fact that the exemptions mentioned in
Section 27 (2) (a) and Section 38 are
negligible and possibly non-existent for all
practical purposes. The Bill will therefore
apply to almost all educational institutions
in the State.
Exercise of Police Power
The police power of the State should not
be exercised in violation of human rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. A Govern-
ment may choose to consider that the police
power thus exercised is in the public interest,
but when there is a clear law protecting the
rights infringed by it, then such exercise is
undoubtedly ultra vires, unless there is some
real substantial justification for it, as, for
instance, during a period of emergency. The
modern trend inpublic policy also inclines
to organise public services within the bounds
of general law, and not outside them.
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Education is not merely a public service.
It involves the fundamental issues of life.
The Christian Churches believe and teach
that it is the responsibility of the parents to
educate their children. If the State considers
that it has a responsibility to educate the
young, its responsibility should not be in
conflict with that of the parents or of the
Church - for the Church too has its respon-
sibility under the divine command, "Go
forth and teach all nations." It is the har-
monisation of interests which, according to
Roscoe Pound, is the ultimate objective of
civil law. A legislature should have this
harmonisation of interests in view while
enacting new law.
That the education of his children is not
a purely secular matter to a Christian- can
be easily proved from the teaching of the
Christian Churches. The form of solemni-
sation of matrimony in the Book of Com-
mon Prayer has it that matrimony "... was
ordained for the procreation of children, to
be brought up in the fear and nurture of the
Lord, and to the praise of His holy name."
In his encyclical letter of October 29, 1939,
Pope Pius XII says:
The charge laid by God on parents to
provide for the material and spiritual good
of their offspring and to procure for them a
suitable training saturated with the true
spirit of religion cannot be wrested from
them without grave violation of their rights.
... [An education] which forgot.., to direct
the eyes and hearts of youth to the heavenly
country would be an injustice to youth, an
injustice against the inalienable duties and
rights of the Christian family, and an excess
to which a check must be offered in the
interests even of the people and of the
State itself.
Not only religious heads, but jurists also
are inclined to the same view. Says Pufen-
dorf: "For take away from the Parents all
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Care and Concern for their Childrens Edu-
cation, and you make a social Life an
impossible and unintelligible Notion."3 In
Lewis v. Graves,4 it was affirmed that "...
the right of the parent to direct the training
and nurture of the child is a fundamental
right." 5 While holding in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters6 that the fundamental theory of
liberty excludes any general power of the
State to standardise its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public
teachers only, Justice McReynolds of the
U. S. Supreme Court said: "The child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recog-
nize and prepare him for additional
obligations."'
Free Exercise of Religion
Thus it is not only a right, but also a
religious duty of a Christian parent to edu-
cate his children. This duty is enjoined on
him by the teaching of the Church. Any
interference with this duty will be a violation
of his right to the free exercise of his
religion. The right freely to practise religion
affirmed in Article 25 (I) of the Constitu-
tion protects acts done in the -exercise of
religion and also those done in pursuance
of religious belief as part of religion. Quoting
with approval a few observations made in
Adelaide Co. v. Australia8 regarding reli-
gious freedom, Mr. Justice Mukherjea re-
marked in Ratilal v. State of Bombay9 :
3 6 PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NA-
TIONS 601 (4th ed. 1729).
4 127 Misc. 135, 215 N. Y. Supp. 632 (Sup. Ct.
1926).
5 Id. at 140, 215 N. Y. Supp. at 637.
6268 U.S. 510 (1925).
7 Id. at 535.
8 67 Com. L.R. 116, 124.
9A.I.R. 1954, S.C. 388.
Religious practices or performances of
acts in pursuance of religious belief are as
much a part of religion as faith or belief in
particular doctrines. No outside authority
has any right to say that these are not an
essential part of religion, and it is not open
to the secular authority of the State to re-
strict or prohibit them in any manner they
like.
In Commissioner of Hindu Religious En-
dowments v. Swamiar ° Mr. Justice
Mukherjea further observed that
the guarantee under our Constitution not
only protects the freedom of religious
opinion, but it protects also acts done in
pursuance of a religion and this is made clear
by the use of the expression, "practice of
religion" in Article 25 .... What constitutes
the essential part of a religion is primarily
to be ascertained with reference to the doc-
trines of that religion itself .... A religious
denomination or organisation enjoys com-
plete autonomy in the matter of deciding as
to what rites and ceremonies are essential
according to the tenets of the religion they
hold, and no outside authority has any
jurisdiction to interfere with their decision
in such matters.
A Christian's religious belief includes the
opinion that it is the duty of the parents to
educate their children. As children grow up,
they are sent by their parents to institutions
where the parental responsibility is carried
forward in a delegated manner by a profes-
sional teacher who takes over, in the com-
mon interests of parents. No average
prudent man will delegate such a responsi-
bility to any unknown person whose ethical
principles may be a spectacular vacuum,
and if a State compels a Christian parent
directly or indirectly to send his children to
such a teacher, the guarantee of religious
freedom in the Constitution will be well
nigh meaningless.
10 A.I.R. 1954, S.C. 282.
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State Cannot Bar Religion
The secular character of a State requires
it to be neutral in its relation with groups
of religious believers and non-believers. It
does not require the State, to quote Justice
Black in Everson v. Board of Education,"
"... to be their adversary. State power is no
more to be used so as to handicap religions
than it is to favor them.' 12
Article 29 (I) of the Constitution affirms
the right of any section of the citizens having
a culture of its own to conserve it, and
Article 30 (I) guarantees to all linguistic
and religious minorities the right to establish
and administer educational institutions of
their choice. The Christians in Kerala are a
section of Indian citizens having a culture
of their own, and they do not believe that
their culture will remain safe and uncon-
taminated if their children are taught by a
body of public teachers who may have scant
respect for that culture.
The Christians of Kerala, again, are a
religious minority. They have therefore the
right to establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice. Section 11 (1) of
the Bill provides that candidates selected by
the Public Service Commission only are to
be appointed as teachers in government and
aided schools. Every educational institution
managed by a minority is likely to be an
aided institution, if Article 30 (2) is re-
spected. If a minority is not permitted to
appoint teachers of their choice without
reference to any outside body, their school
will cease to be of their choice. As Mr.
Justice Chagla expressed it in another con-
nexion, in Bombay Education Society v.
State of Bombay13 : "If the Board were to
11330 U.S. 1 (1946).
12 Id. at 18.
Is A.I.R. 1954, Rom. 468.
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comply with the government's suggestion
then the institution which it will be admin-
istering would not be a school of its own
choice, but the choice of the State." The
choice of the minority community is that
they should have a school where the teachers
should be God-fearing men and women who
by precept and example, as becoming their
status as delegates of Christian parents, will
bring up the children of the community "in
the fear and nurture of the Lord."
Police Power Must Yield
Mr. Justice Das of the Supreme Court
(the present Chief Justice) observed in State
of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society
that the powers of the State to make reason-
able regulation for all schools cannot be
lightly questioned ". . . and certainly not in
so far as their exercise is not inconsistent
with or contrary to the fundamental rights
guaranteed to the citizens." After referring
to Bartel v. Iowa14 and to Meyer v. Ne-
braska,15 he continued:
Where a minority has a fundamental right
to conserve its language, script and culture
under Article 29 (I), and to the right to
establish and administer educational insti-
tutions of their choice under Article 30 (I),
surely then there must be implicit in such
fundamental right, the right to impart in-
struction in their own institutions, to the
children of their own community in their
own language. To hold otherwise will be to
deprive the Articles 29 (I) and 30 (I) of the
greater part of their contents. Such being
the fundamental right, the police power of
the State to determine the medium of in-
struction must yield to their fundamental
right to the extent it is necessary to give
effect to it, and cannot be permitted to run
counter to it.
14 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
15 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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In State of Bombay v. Bombay Education
Society the question at issue was the medium
of instruction: in the Kerala Bill it is the
appointment of teachers. There does not
seem to be anything else to differentiate the
Bombay government's order from the
Kerala Bill.
It is also submitted that when teachers
of materialistic or atheistic inclinations are
forced upon a Christian school, the admini-
stration of the institution contemplated in
Article 30 (I) virtually passes from the
hands of the minority.
Unreasonable Restrictions
When a candidate for appointment as a
teacher in an aided school has the necessary
academic and professional qualifications
prescribed by the State or the University,
the insistence that he should be selected by
the Public Service Commission is an unrea-
sonable restriction on the exercise of the
right conferred by Article 19 (I) (g), to
practise any profession, or to carry on any
occupation, trade or business.
In Chintaman v. State of M. P.,16 Mr.
Justice Mahajan observed:
16A.I.R. 1951, S.C. 118.
The phrase 'reasonable restriction' con-
notes that the limitation imposed upon a
person in enjoyment of the right should not
be arbitrary or of an excessive nature,
beyond what is required in the interests of
the public.... Legislation which arbitrarily
or excessively invades the right, cannot be
said to contain the quality of reasonableness,
and uhless it strikes a proper balance be-
tween the freedom guaranteed under Article
19 (I) (g) and the social control permitted
by clause (6) of Art. 19, it must be held to
be wanting in that quality .... The determi-
nation by the legislature of what constitutes
a reasonable restriction is not final or con-
clusive: it is subject to the supervision of
this Court.
The Kerala Bill under the pretext of pro-
tecting public interest, arbitrarily imposes
unreasonable and excessive restrictions
upon lawful occupations like teaching and
administering educational institutions.
Sections 6 (I) and (3) of the Bill regard-
ing restriction on the alienation of the prop-
erty of aided schools are repugnant to
Article 19 (I) (f) of the Constitution.
Because of these repugnancies, one may
assume that the Bill will not stand any
judicial examination.
